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Abstract 
A new method of modelling, based on agents, observation and experiment, provides a 
framework in which to represent behaviour that is immediately experienced rather 
than circumscribed. Ths paper discusses the principles behind the method, and 
explores its relevance to topical controversies concerning explanation of the 
behaviour of complex systems.  
1. Introduction 
In a previous paper [2], we have argued that the formal concept of computation is 
inadequate for modern applications of computing. The result is a tension between 
principles and pragmatism that manifests itself in many areas of Computer Science, 
including  
•  abstract programming paradigms, 
•  complex software systems development, 
•  programming for AI and end-user applications, 
•  mathematical foundations of programming. 
The essence of programming lies in prescribing and interpreting the behaviour of 
reliable state-changing devices [3]. Traditional mathematical modelling is oriented 
towards describing the behaviour of devices or systems that resemble conventional 
computers, whose reliability of operation can be taken on trust, and whose mode of 
interaction with its environment is preconceived and circumscribed. To meet such 
challenges as are encountered in programming reactive systems [4,10], reliable 
patterns of interaction between system components have to be identified, exploited 
and monitored throughout the programming process. For this purpose, we need 
rigorous computer-based modelling methods that take account of an evolving real-
world situation and enable us to combine principles of abstract mathematical 
modelling with observation and experiment.  
In this paper, we explore the limitations of classical mathematical approaches to 
describing, prescribing and explaining complex system behaviour, and outline our 
progress towards developing an alternative principled agent-oriented approach to 
modelling that can address these issues more effectively.  
2. System behaviour: fundamental concepts 
Few accounts of programming and specification issues do justice to the extraordinary 
subtlety and complexity of the concept of system behaviour. Conventional notions about the nature of behaviour stem from two traditions: classical applied mathematics, 
where the behaviour of complex systems can sometimes be predicted by simple laws, 
and classical sequential programming (cf Harel's 1-person programs [10]), where the 
mode of communication from machine to user, the mode of observation of machine 
by user, and the protocol for interaction between user and computer is entirely 
preconceived. Modern developments in applied mathematics and computing suggest 
the need for more powerful theories. The expressive power and utility of conventional 
mathematical models is one focus of attention in the controversy surrounding 
reductionism [6,8]. Formidable problems have been identified in the search for 
mathematical models for biological systems [6,7,8], and for reactive systems [ 10]. 
2.1. What is a behaviour?  
There are many hidden presumptions behind the concept of a behaviour. To define a 
be-haviour we must choose what to observe, how we observe it, and when (e.g. how 
frequently) we observe it. An entity or attribute can only serve as an observable in a 
context where its integrity is respected in transformation. The behaviour is then 
defined by the pattern of changes of state to such observables. Special conventions for 
observation have to operate where the changes of state are continuous. In a concurrent 
system, we have to deal with simultaneous changes of state.  
Informally, we can speak of a behaviour with reference to several observations of the 
same things at different times or on different occasions. There is an important 
distinction between behaviour as defined by changes of state that are immediately 
experienced (such as the behaviour of a group of people at a party) and the behaviour 
associated with preconceived reliable patterns of state change (such as the succession 
of the seasons). Traditional mathematical models are concerned with behaviour only 
in the latter sense, where the context for observation is circumscribed and what is to 
be observed is to some extent anticipated. For immediate experience of behaviour we 
have only to perceive identities, but recognising circumscribed behaviour requires 
some presumption about the reliability and repeatability of the observation.  
The relationship between behaviour as immediately experienced, and behaviour as 
circumscribed is the central theme of this paper. Since circumscribed behaviour 
involves some preconception about what is to be observed it implicitly involves an 
expression of faith. Subject to invoking this act-of-faith, we can often use a 
mathematical model as a basis for description and prediction of a circumscribed 
behaviour - we know that Spring will follow Winter. Where behaviour is immediately 
experienced, in contrast, we are not constrained to focus our attention upon the pattern 
of change in particular observables. This lends an entirely different quality to our 
experience of a phenomenon, as there is no restriction upon the attributes that can be 
taken into account in observation. This theme is well-developed in the theological 
writings of Martin Buber. For instance, [5: p17]:  
In the work of art realisation in one sense means loss of reality in another.  
Everyday experience simultaneously involves circumscribed and immediately 
experienced behaviours. For instance, when we watch a play, only particular actions 
and attributes of the set and the actors are specified in the script of a play. From one 
production to another, and one performance to another, the precise activity on the stage will vary in respect of unscripted details. In the circumscribed behaviour that the 
script defines, what is meant to be observed is declared by the playwright. What is 
actually perceived to happen by a theatregoer is a subjective matter - depending upon 
who does the observing. It is often important to be able to take account of both kinds 
of behaviour within the same model. For instance, we may need to redesign the layout 
for a control interface when, because of a coincidental resemblance outside the scope 
of our circumscribed model, a user has confused a clock reading with a dial.  
2.2. Experiment  
Experiment is a way of bridging the gap between immediately experienced and 
circumscribed bchaviour. In an experiment, the framework for observation of a 
phenomenon is set down: what observables are to be monitored, what events are to be 
recognised as significant. Conceiving an experiment presumes that is to possible to 
create the same context for observation many times. In these respects, experiment 
resembles circumscribed behaviour, but an authentic experiment also has elements of 
immediate experience. The experimentor typically has some autonomous control over 
the values of particular observables, and may have no clear expectation of what 
consequent effects will be obtained.  
Experiment has a paradoxical quality. When an experiment is performed for the very 
first time, the outcome is a matter of immediate experience. When the same outcome 
has been obtained so many times that we are in a position to express faith in its 
reliability, we can reinterpret it as a circumscribed behaviour. The important and 
subtle point to note here is that the transition from behaviour immediately experienced 
to behaviour that is circumscribed is a shift in viewpoint on the part of the observer, 
and involves no change in the experimental activity itself. The faith of the 
experimentor is in no way a guarantee that the experiment will always fulfil 
expectations. From this perspective, it is useful to view all behaviour as immediately 
experienced, and circumscribed behaviour as behaviour immediately experienced but 
reinterpreted in the context of faith.  
2.3. Explanatory modelling: the classical perspective  
The question: What is an explanation of behaviour? has direct relevance for 
applications of computing in AI and engineering design. The classical scientific view, 
as posed and critically analysed in [6], is: an explanation of some phenomenon 
consists of deduction, from natural laws, of that phenomenon. By this definition, the 
idealised motion of a projectile is explained by Newton's Law. Certainly the 
invocation of Newton's Law is more than an explicit description of projectile motion - 
it expresses the way in which the expected behaviour of the projectile depends 
functionally upon the choice of initial parameters. We can also explain our definition 
of the trajectory with reference to experimental data showing that projectile motion is 
governed by Newtonian mechanics.  
In interpreting the Newtonian explanation for projectile motion, it is significant that 
Newton's law is formulated relative to a particular observational context. We measure 
the mass and (x,y) position of the projectile, and observe a clock. We discount air-
resistance, regard the projectile as a point-mass, assume constant gravity etc. By 
implication, other attributes of the projectile (e.g. its colour, its chemical consitution) are presumed irrelevant, so that (say) the colour of a projectile does not explain its 
motion. In arriving at Newton's law, the law and the observational context are 
developed in conjunction through an experimental process.  
One view of the scientific method presumes that every phenomenon can in principle 
be explained through a reductionist application of a hierarchy of natural laws. An 
ecosystem is explained in terms of organisms whose behaviour is explained in terms 
of proteins and macromolecules and DNA code ... until ultimately all behaviour is 
reduced to The Theory of Everything [8]. Cohen and Stewart [6] argue cogently that 
"[science] is a far less coherent structure than is admitted in the orthodox caricature of 
the scientific method", and that "we need a new kind of theory, in which suitable 
aspects of phenomenan can be understood without referring them to lower-level 
rules". One of their primary concerns is the intractability of the mathematical 
problems associated with analysing and reasoning about abstract behaviours 
associated with natural laws. In this paper, we argue that many of the most relevant 
issues cannot be addressed by conventional mathematical modelling - a radically 
different framework for modelling behaviour is required.  
3. Modelling behaviour: the modern perspective 
3.1. Models of behaviour for Computer Science  
As discussed in detail in [2], classical mathematical models of behaviour provide an 
insufficient foundation for each of the key areas of Computer Science cited above.  
In programming paradigms:  
•  incorporating user-interaction into preconceived patterns of behaviour is 
problematic, 
•  new media for communication force us to consider modes of behaviour that 
cannot be expressed formally in conventional terms, 
In AI  
•  concurrent programming applications demand a higher degree of dynamism 
and mobility of processes. 
In software engineering:  
•  abstract mathematical models of behaviour aren't well-adapted for incremental 
or evolutionary development e.g. in concurrent engineering, where refinement 
of the model occurs over a long period of time with reference to diverse and 
continuously developing modes of observation and experiment, 
•  abstract mathematical models of behaviour don't give sufficient insight into 
issues of engineering feasibility or into the potential implications of 
engineering decisions e.g. in respect of fault-tolerance, 
•  the design of an engineering product requires a different kind of justification 
from pure deduction from laws: there is a role for experimental evidence and 
for particular knowledge (e.g. rules about features). and applications:  
•  logicist accounts of intelligent behaviour are ill-suited to dealing with e.g. the 
response of a robot to situations that are not preconceived, 
•  formal models of behaviour do not address the issues of associating form and 
content that arise when programming a robot, 
•  formal models of behaviour do not take account of the role of views in 
interaction in a concurrent system and in human interpretation of behaviour, 
•  the classical explanatory framework cannot be applied to qualitative concerns 
such as arise in aesthetic design or subjective user-interface preferences. 
Computer methods have come to play an ever more significant role in the process of 
understanding complex systems. For instance, Cohen and Stewart [6] draw attention 
to the substitution of computer simulation for proofs. Without principled ways to 
carry out such simulations it is hard to establish the formal status of such an approach.  
3.2. Insect colonies: describing and understanding behaviour  
Insect colonies are often cited as a challenge for reductionist approaches to describing 
and explaining behaviour. They provide archetypal examples of the difficulties of 
reconciling specification of global system behaviour with prescription of component 
activities.  
In [6], Cohen and Stewart cite Langton's Ant as an example of a cellular automaton 
with a simple rule-based specification that apparently always leads to a particular 
emergent behaviour. Langton's Ant illustrates that, even with explicit knowledge of 
the Theory of Everything for a simple system, it may not be feasible to deduce the 
properties of the system at a higher level of abstraction. By implication, the 
mathematical problems of accounting for the behaviour of colonies on the basis of the 
characteristics of individual insects are likely to prove at least as intractable.  
Cohen and Stewart's concerns about reductionism reinforce the idea that the problems 
of understanding or developing complex systems demand much more holistic 
treatment than premature transformation to an abstract mathematical model permits. It 
may be that, in studying a real-world colony of insects, we are forced to acknowledge 
that the behaviour of individual insects stand in just such a relation to the behaviour of 
the colony as Langton's Ant exemplifies. Should we decide that this is the case, 
however, it must be on the basis of all available experimental evidence. To this end, it 
must be possible to take account of experimental input throughout the modelling 
process:  
•  to allow experimental input to influence the evolving model 
•  to enable the model to guide the choice of the experimental framework 
To counter the idea that mathematical abstractions in themselves hold the key to the 
description and explanation of behaviour of complex systems, we develop a fictional 
scenario about the behaviour of colonies of imaginary insects, called ficts.  
Ficts are one of the oldest forms of life on the planets Alias and Bias in the solar 
system of Elias. They are renowned for the extraordinary configurations into which they organise themselves, and have been the object of scientific study on both planets. 
The principal and original inhabitants of Alias are the A-I: they have a highly 
intelligent and technologically advanced civilisation that has now colonised large 
areas of Bias. The inhabitants of Bias are the B-O: a people infamous for their 
powerful scent who are far less advanced in scientific matters, but have a very well-
developed sense of humour.  
The A-I have been studying ficts for many centuries. Crude depictions of fict 
configurations, or conficts, appear on the walls of caves from the first century C1 of 
the Alian calendar. Conficts were first depicted as religious icons in the tenth century, 
when they were typically carved on bark in idealised forms with a high degree of 
symmetry. For many centuries, identifying and interpreting geometric patterns in 
conficts was an important skill that could only be practised by Alian religious leaders. 
Recognising such patterns often required unusual powers of imagination, but anyone 
who questioned the objectivity of leaders, or attempted to give more accurate 
representations of conficts was regarded as a heretic, and risked persecution and 
death. One such heretic was the C15th Allan artist Leonilla, who developed much 
more refined methods of drawing, and was the first to construct realistic images of 
conficts that were later to be useful in scientific analysis. Since C21, the old religious 
taboos have been forgotten, as conficts have been represented by photographs, videos 
and computer simulations.  
The theory that conficts consisted of colonies of ficts was well-established long before 
the invention of the microscope first made it possible to observe individual ficts. 
Microscopic examination made it apparent that conficts were of two kinds: active, 
when the individual ficts were in motion, and quiescent, when the ficts were at rest. 
Shortly after they discovered magnetism in C20, the A-I observed that quiescent 
conficts were arranged in orbits that followed the lines in the local magnetic field. On 
this basis, they were able to attribute the well-established 10 year cycle of confict 
patterns to the 10 year Elian cycle of solar activity and to explain the unusual 
behaviour of conficts in the vicinity of power cables. The organisation of active 
conficts at present remains a mystery to the A-I.  
The B-O have a relatively naive scientific understanding of confict behaviour. As they 
are much smaller creatures than the A-I, and have more acute vision, they are able to 
see individual ficts directly, but -from the perspective of the A-I -are handicapped 
experimentally by the fact that active conficts are thrown into confusion by a B-O 
presence. For this reason, the B-O have only been able to study quiescent conficts in 
detail. Long before the A-I developed the microscope, the B-O already knew of the 
correlation between the clockwise / anticlockwise orientation of ficts in their orbits 
and the red / black colour of the ficts on Bias. The celebrated Bian scientist Bodkin 
tried to prove that the colour of ficts determined their orientation by dyeing black ficts 
red, but this experiment failed. This result would not have surprised the A-I, as - 
unknown to the B-O - there are red varieties of fict on Alias that adopt an 
anticlockwise orientation.  
Neither the A-I nor the B-O have gained much insight into the way in which active 
conficts are organised. The B-O can only catch glimpses of active conficts, which 
degenerate into chaos as they approach. The B-O are foolish enough to suppose that 
ficts are very intelligent: they believe that ritual joke-telling ceremonies - similar to those practised by the Bians themselves -account for the shape of active conficts, and 
that ficts are engulfed by the overpowering sense of humour of approaching Bian 
observers, and fall about laughing. The A-I, in contrast, fail to realise that ficts are 
very intelligent, and that in active conficts they organise themselves into patterns to 
leave scent traces that record the location of food sources, predators, local features etc 
in a complex language. Neither do they realise that the alignment and orientation to 
the magnetic field of quiescent conficts is a matter of social convention (dating from 
C13) that serves to minimise the energy consumption of the colony when it is not 
engaged in recording such information. It is the scent of the B-O that overpowers the 
pheronomes in an active confict - a fact quite inexplicable to the A-I, who have 
neither experienced nor developed the concept of scent.  
4. Analysis of the fict fiction 
4.1. Situated modelling  
Our fictional scenario motivates a different perspective on the behaviour of complex 
systems from that suggested by focusing upon mathematical abstractions in isolation. 
Examination of the way in which the A-I and the B-O observe and explain the 
behaviour of conficts illustrates how our theory of confict behaviour will be 
influenced by  
•  what we choose to observe of the colony and the ficts  
e.g. Bodkin tries to correlate colour of ficts with fict orientation, 
•  what we believe ficts are capable of perceiving and affecting  
e.g. A-I don't appreciate that ficts communicate in forming active conficts, 
•  what we are ourselves capable of perceiving and affecting  
e.g. A-I can detect and perturb magnetic fields, and observe Elian solar 
activity, 
•  what we can accurately record / register in experiment with appropriate 
instrumentation / computation / perceptualisation  
e.g. A-I have no metaphor for scent, and no instruments to register scent, 
•  what conventions we establish for interpretation of what we experience  
e.g. A-I priesthood interpret conficts as religious icons. 
Of course, our illustrative example is contrived, but these influences upon a theory of 
behaviour are all represented in carrying out a complex engineering task. In building 
an airbus, for instance, we have to isolate the significant observables and organise the 
activity of the human agents and the electronic components to operate within their 
performance capabilities. We base our construction and organisation upon 
experimental knowledge gained from simulating fragments of the system state, using 
appropriate metaphors and instrumentation to reflect state in a way that we can 
perceive and interpret. We rely upon conventions for the interpretation of experience 
both in the experimental process (e.g. training the engineers to interpret circuit 
diagrams and use oscilloscopes) and in the development of the final product (e.g. 
designing the instrument panel, training the pilot, taking account of aircraft safety 
conventions).  
Analysis of the fict fiction leads us to appreciate the way in which the perceived 
behaviour of a system is a function of the characteristics and context for interaction of the agents within the system and those of the observer. The modelling to which we 
aspire is aimed at articulating this dependency of system behaviour upon the 
characteristics of the constituents of the system and the perspective of the observer. 
The history of the study of conficts is intended to illustrate how radically any theory 
of behaviour depends upon the context in which it is conceived. This motivates 
models that can be developed and evolved in conjunction with experimentation in a 
real-world situation.  
Activity of just this nature is represented in traditional engineering. The history of 
aircraft design illustrates the systematic refinement of a theory of behaviour, whereby 
knowledge is acquired through decades of experience of monitoring aircraft, pilots 
and passengers, of developing materials and technologies, of investigating 
aerodynamics in theory and practice. By comparing a modern aeroplane with its 
earliest ancestors, we can appreciate what a rich interaction between experimental 
insights and evolving theories has contributed to the development of flight. Over this 
period, we have accumulated what we presume to be reliable knowledge about what 
attributes of the aeroplane are relevant to its performance, how the choice of these 
parameters affects its behaviour, what conventions are appropriate for the cockpit 
layout and the pilot communication protocols, etc.  
We use our fict scenario as a way of motivating "situated modelling" techniques [12], 
in which a model is developed in the context of a real-world situation. The models we 
can develop in this way are necessarily quite different in character from traditional 
mathematical models. The power of our development method derives from the idea of 
systematically refining our system model by using experiment to identify more and 
more precisely which factors serve to determine the behaviour. But if our theories 
about the behaviour of a system are open to refinement through experiment at any 
stage, they are also in principle subject to refutation. These observations point to a 
profound distinction between the two approaches to modelling.  
4.2. Classical modelling  
In making a mathematical model of the behaviour of a system, we create an abstract 
representation that can only be enriched by subsequent observation in preconceived 
ways. For instance, we may represent the behaviour by a differential equation of a 
particular form, and subsequently estimate the coefficients by experiment. In 
Langton's ant model, we make the presumption that everything we need to know 
about the ant is captured in the mathematical prescription of its behaviour. In such a 
context, it is meaningless to ask the question: can the ant remember whether it has 
visited a cell before?  
A mathematical model of a system may be said to offer an explanation of a 
phenomenon in as much as the effects of changing a parameter can be predicted from 
theory. The quality of such an explanation depends entirely upon how precisely the 
actual system behaviour conforms to the mathematical model. There are many issues 
to be considered in assessing this conformance:  
•  to what extent is the mathematical model an idealisation?  
- the traditional objectives of behavioural abstraction are to guarantee freedom from ambiguity and to eliminate conflicts, but an actual system typically 
behaves in a singular way in special circumstances;  
•  have we identified the only system parameters subject to change?  
- there may be many ways to view the behaviour of a system, and an abstract 
mathematical model typically only addresses one of these views; 
•  does the mathematical model relate the behaviour of a system to its structure?  
- the way in which a system is engineered profoundly affects its response to 
exceptional circumstances (consider e.g. the effect of a B-O presence upon 
conficts) and failure conditions (consider e.g. the implications of one fict 
acquiring the opposite magnetic polarity). An abstract mathematical model 
typically takes no account of this. 
The quality of the insights that a mathematical model can give into a system depends 
upon how successfully the system behaviour has been circumscribed. Every 
invocation of the mathematical model is an implicit expression of faith in the 
reliability of the phenomena that inform its construction. The degree of faith that can 
be put in the abstraction is determined solely by the experimentation that precedes the 
conception of the model. The process of circumscribing behaviour abstracts patterns 
of agent activity that provide the basis for prediction. In this way, the autonomy of 
agents can no longer be expressed. This elimination of agents from a behavioural 
model can be seen as a virtue in some contexts (cf Hoare [11 ], Russell [ 13]) but in 
fact detracts greatly from its explanatory power. Further confirmation of the important 
role that metaphors for immediately experienced behaviour can play in 
complementing abstract mathematical models can be found in [9].  
There are two principal respects in which traditional mathematical models are 
insufficient for explaining and developing complex systems. We need:  
•  a framework within which to express the modelling activity that precedes an 
expression of faith in the reliability of a phenomenon. Only in such a 
framework can we properly reflect the autonomy of agents, and correctly 
attribute features of the behaviour to their perceptions and capabilities. 
•  to be able to represent activities that involve circumscribing the behaviour of a 
system in ways that cannot be expressed formally in a conventional manner. 
For instance, the designer of an aeroplane will observe conventions in cockpit 
layout that have no basis in natural laws, but are nonetheless determined by 
the physical characteristics of pilots and the historical traditions that are 
implicitly represented in their training. 
5. Agents, observation and experiments 
5.1. Agent-oriented modelling over definitive representations of state: principles  
The philosophical framework for studying behaviour considered in this paper is 
informed by a wide range of case studies associated with the development of new 
techniques of agent-oriented modelling. More detailed discussions of the relevant 
concepts and principles appear in a companion paper [15], and in other references (cf. 
[2]). In this context, we shall focus on identifying the features of our modelling 
method that are most relevant to the theme of describing and explaining the behaviour 
of complex systems.  In our modelling framework, observables are represented by variables. In observing a 
behaviour, there are certain indivisible relationships amongst observables, so that for 
example, the instant at which the minute-hand passes midnight may also be the instant 
at which a new year begins, and the point in time at which a savings policy matures. 
Such dependencies between observables are modelled by unidirectional constraints, 
and expressed using systems of definitions, or definitive scripts.  
The semantics of a definitive script resembles that of a spreadsheet, in that it typically 
represents one state in a real-world behaviour that is immediately experienced. For 
instance, in a spreadsheet that represents the current state of a financial account, it is 
in general impossible to predict the form and effect of the next transaction. The use of 
definitive scripts as the fundamental method of representing perceived system state is 
consistent with the idea that behaviour that is directly experienced is more primitive 
than circumscribed behaviour (cf §2.2).  
The power to model immediate experience distinguishes our approach from most 
other computational frameworks, many of which are based solely upon abstractions 
for describing circumscribed behaviour. Modelling immediate experience is the key to 
modelling experiment and to representing related activities, such as design. The 
typical interaction of the experimentor or designer is to modify a definitive script by 
redefining a variable. Such an action resembles "what if?" activity in a spreadsheet.  
The concept of modelling immediate experience depends crucially upon the existence 
of appropriate metaphors. It is easy for me to convey the dimensions of the table upon 
which I am currently working, or to draw a picture to represent its shape, but I know 
of no way to communicate the smell of the dregs of tea in my mug with any degree of 
faithfulness. Significant factors in exploiting metaphors are the extent to which people 
can be trained to interpret metaphors (e.g. to understand a circuit diagram, or to 
interpret the visual display on a security system), and the extent to which the status of 
appropriate observables can be made perceptible. The power of the computer to 
animate metaphorical changes of state is the key to representing immediate 
experience. In animation, the choice of metaphor determines the values that are 
associated with variables in a definitive script, and the algebraic relationships that are 
used to express their dependency. The values of different types supply the underlying 
algebras for different definitive notations [2].  
A definitive script can be seen as representing an agent's view of a complex system. 
We use the term agent to refer to an entity that plays a role in the representation and 
transformation of system state. Agents typically respond to changes in observables, 
and act through changing the values of observables. These activities are respectively 
modelled as monitoring the values of variables, and redefining variables. 
Simultaneous action on the part of two or more agents is generally possible, and is 
modelled by simultaneous redefinition. Agents are not necessarily persistent, and can 
be dynamically invoked or destroyed. The authentic value of each observable is 
bound to a particular agent, but can be directly observed and possibly changed by 
other agents.  
In simulating the behaviour of a system of agents, the first step is the specification of 
those observables that are bound to an agent, those that is conditionally privileged to 
change and those that is able to observe. This specification is represented using the special-purpose LSD notation. In animation from an LSD specification, we take 
account of the enabling conditions that must be satisfied before the values of 
observables can be changed, and the perceived events that serve as stimuli for agent 
action. The animation is executed in the computational framework of the Abstract 
Definitive Machine, an environment in which the user can act as a superagent to 
dynamically impose appropriate scenarios for action and interaction upon agents.  
The degree of agent autonomy exercised in the simulation depends on the extent to 
which an ADM program is driven by human intervention rather than under 
preconceived automatic control. Where agent actions conflict, as for instance in an 
attempt to change the same observable simultaneously, this can be detected in the 
computational framework. In this context, the ADM user can act as an arbitrator to 
declare the outcome of such a conflict. This approach to modelling system behaviour 
is consistent with the idea that the concept of corporate behaviour of a family of 
autonomous agents is only meaningful with reference to an external mode of 
observation (cf §2.1 ).  
To realise the full potential of modelling with agents and definitive scripts requires a 
more sophisticated machine model than the ADM currently provides. An important 
aspect of developing models that reflect experimental insight is the reinterpretation of 
immediately experienced behaviour as circumscribed behaviour via an act-of-faith (cf 
§2.2). One example of activity of this nature, familiar to experienced users of object-
oriented development environments, occurs when generic features of different 
components are identified in a model, and these components can be replaced by 
instances of a new object. Another familiar process of abstraction arises in connection 
with the hierarchical decomposition of a model, such as is required to express the 
integrity of parallel activity of designers in the concurrent engineering process [1]. An 
extension of the ADM that supports these features is the focus for our current 
research, and is well-suited to our conception of explanation of system behaviour as 
described in §6.  
5.2. Agent-oriented modelling over definitive representations of state: 
applications  
The modelling methods that we are developing aim to capture the characteristic views 
and capabilities of all the agents in a system in an open-ended manner. Two 
complementary kinds of activity are involved in the development of our models:  
•  the refinement of agent models in the light of experiment; 
•  commitment to expressions of faith in how agents can be expected to operate. 
The use of explicit state-based methods for representing agent views extends to the 
observers of the system, to include even the modeller herself. In this way - through 
the use of metaphor - it is possible to simulate experiment, and to represent the 
considerations that guide modelling decisions (such as the choice of an interface 
mechanism, or the construction of an aesthetically pleasing geometric object) for 
which there can be no formal specification.  
Our philosophy of modelling leads us to identify a most significant distinction 
between the conception of system behaviour that is developed though real-world observation, and the emulation of this behaviour by reliable state-changing devices. 
These two perspectives on phenomena correspond closely to top-down and bottom-up 
reductionism as discussed in [6]. Cohen and Stewart attribute the difficulty of 
marrying top-down and bottom-up analysis to the presence of a 'no man's land' they 
term Ant Country. They argue that the reductionist chain of logic does not traverse 
Ant Country, and that scientific explanation of complex phenomena accordingly relies 
not upon logic, but upon the use of analogy and "expressions of faith".  
To justify our approach, we must go further in repudiating the reductionist position. 
For us, there is a fundamental qualitative difference between behaviour as observed in 
the real-world and behaviour as modelled using reliable devices. The gap between 
these two views of behaviour can only be bridged by experiment and expressions of 
faith. It is not simply that top-down analysis and bottom-up analysis "diverge into 
deductions too lengthy for the human mind to comprehend them" [6], but that there is 
in general no chain of logic to connect them.  
To accommodate this shift in perspective, we have to give an alternative to the 
reductionist account of explaining system behaviour. Understanding through 
experiment how system behaviour depends upon the perceptions and capabilities of 
the agents and the mode of observation is the key to this. In the fict scenario, the 
orientation of ficts in conficts on Bias is perceived to depend on the colour of the 
ficts. This type of dependency may play a useful role in high-level reasoning about 
life on Bias, for instance, making it possible for an A-I scientist to determine the 
polarisation of a bar magnet by observing its effect upon a fict colony. But logically 
valid as this dependency is in its context, it cannot be interpreted as asserting that the 
orientation of ficts in a confict is explained by its colour, as Bodkin's experiment 
demonstrates. A more satisfactory explanation would be given by the discovery (say) 
that the presence of a particular gene was correlated with fict colour and fict 
orientation.  
We can regard explaining behaviour as 'correctly' attributing system behaviour to 
characteristic properties of its constituents in accordance with the results of 
observation and experiment. By this criterion, the A-rs presumption that the 
organisation of quiescent conficts is the expression of a natural law is suspect. There 
is surely an objective criterion for preferring the explanation that quiescent conficts 
are organised by social convention rather than out of physical necessity. There will be 
certain experiments that can be performed to establish this, and perhaps historical 
evidence dating from pre-C13 to confirm.  
6. Summary 
The significance of an observation- and agent-oriented perspective to modelling can 
be summarised as follows:  
 
it binds the form of the system model to its content.  
Whereas the form of an abstract mathematical model of behaviour can be arbitrarily 
chosen so long as its interpretation stands in a preconceived relation to a real-world 
situation (cf. the promiscuous modelling discussed by Cantwell-Smith in [14]), observation and experiment supply an objective criterion by which to discriminate 
between our agent-oriented models.  
•  it provides a framework within which to represent and systematically explore 
system behaviour that is imperfectly and incompletely understood.  
Traditional approaches to mathematical modelling of complex systems and the 
orthodox theory of computation promote the idea that the problems of 
understanding complex systems are essentially mathematical in nature. The 
fict scenario challenges the view that problems such as reasoning about the 
emergent behaviour of Langton's ant are properly representative of the issues 
involved in explaining system behaviour. For instance, Alian experimental 
knowledge and insight into active conficts is such that no mathematician, 
however ingenious, could account for their behaviour without developing 
entirely new concepts and abstractions. Our primary objective is to develop 
means to represent the partial information upon which theories of behaviour 
can later be established. The most important concern is that any abstract 
behavioural problems should be situated in an appropriate observational 
context. 
•  it offers an altemative to a fully reductionist account of system behaviour.  
Our explanations of system behaviour refer to autonomous actions of agents 
operating at many levels of abstraction, and to appropriate assumptions about 
the reliability of their response and the characteristics of the environment for 
their interaction. We do not see it as appropriate to explain the social 
conventions of the ficts in terms of activity at a lower level of abstraction, 
such as natural laws. In our view, the attribution of behaviour to agents is a 
crucial factor in providing models that can be used to investigate fault-
tolerance, to frame experiments that can lead to refinement of the system and 
to adapt systems to new requirements.  
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